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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 9939

WILLIAM KEITH BURRIS,
Defendant and Appellant. .

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE ISSUES

INVOLVED
This matter came before the court upon an information charging the defendant with Bastardy, charging in
effect that as the result o'f acts of sexual intercourse on
or about the 2nd day of February, 1962, and on or about
the 11th day of February, 1962, in C-edar City, Iron County,
Utah, \vith one Bonne Ann Bauer, an unmarried female, said
Bonnie Ann Bauer became pregnant and that the defendant \Vas the father of said child.
A. plea of not guilty \vas entered by the defendant and
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the matter was tried in December of 1962 before an Iron
County jury which unanimously found him guilty. Judgment
was entered by the District Court of Iron County, Utah on
or about the 14th day of February, 1963. At the time of
the trial defendant's defense was primarily an attempt to
prove to the jury that the prosecutrix testimony was subJect to many questions of creditability and should not be
accepted by the jury. At the time of the trial the complaint,
the amended complaint and the information \vere exhibited
to the jury and copies thereof were placed in evidence and
were sent to the jury room as such.
At the time of the trial the jury was instructed by the
District Judge and instruction No. 8 in effect instructed
the jury to Disregard these items of pleadings that had
been entered in evidence. ·
An appeal was taken before the supreme court of the
state of Utah by the appellant which was decided and filed
on 15 January, 1964. In said appeal Point III of the appellant was as fol1ows: "The trial judge instructed the jury
to disregard some of the evidence."
This point is not mentioned in the opinion of the Supreme Court filed 15 January, 1964, and is not decided
thereby.

"ARGUMENT"
POINT I
POINT NO. III OF THE APPEAL, "THE TRIAL
JUDGE INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO DISREGARD SOME
OF THE EVIDENCE" SHOULD HA V'E A SPECIFIC FINDING.
There can be no argument as to the content of_Instru~
tion No. 8 as submitted to the jury by the trial judge. It IS
as follows, to-wit:
"You are instructed that this matter arose and came
before the court based upon the complaint of Bonnie Ann
Bauer and the information filed by the District Attorney.
The complaint and the information are in substance and
effect legal pleadings and a \vay of getting the matter before the court for determination. Ho\vever, such documents
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are not evidence and the fact that an accusation is made is
not evidence; also the fact that the court instructs you
concerning the making of an accusation against the defendant is in itself no evidence and is not to be taken as
any indication that the court either believes or does not
believe the allegation of the said legal pleadings."
This is a stock instruction given in most criminal cases
and in many civil cases and except for the use of these
documents in attempting to attack the creditability of the
prosecutrix would have been correct. Inasmuch as the doc·
uments had been entered in evidence and copies thereof
sent to the jury room as exhibits it amounts to an instruction to disregard a portion of the evidence and is prejudicial and is reversible error.
The trial court admitted that it was in error on the
motion for rehearing with the finding and decision that
this instruction was error but that it was not material.
Can one say this when from a practical standpoint the only
issue to the jury is the creditability of the prosecutrix.
One of the time honored and always accepted ways of
attacking the creditability of any witness is the proof of
conflicting statements. The pleadings offered in evidence
were proof of prior inconsistent statements under oath. At
the time they were offered in evidence they were not objf'cted to on the grounds of materiality and if so the ohjPction would have been overruled. For the purpose offered
thry were n1aterial and \Vere correctly introduced in evidence. Thereafter the jury was instructed by the court to
disregard them \Vhich amounted to an instruction to disregard some of the evidence. Is there any reason ever to
put evidence in front of a jury if they are after\vards to be
instructed to disregard it? What is the purpose of evidence?
His Honor. the District Judge, felt that the instruction was
error but that the error \vas not material.
The Attorney General of the state of Utah has adopted
1 very strange position in connection with this point. In the
last paragraph on page 9 of Respondent's Brief are found
the following sentences, to-\vit: "Therefore, it is obvious
that the instruction pertained to the original complaint,
which \Vas filed in the matter, and had absolutely nothing
to do \Vith the copies 'vhich \vere introduced by defendant in
the course of the trial as evidence. These, of course, were
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submitted to the jury for inspection and for their consideration, and there can be no doubt that the jury understood
that this instruct]on pertained to the original complaint
and not to the copies which were introduced for the purposes of impeachment by defending counsel." The undersigned is of the opinion that the attorney general had his
tongue in his cheek while sponsoring this thought. Also
if the memory of the undersigned .is correct the original
documents \vere. placed in evidence and exhibited to the
jury and the copies placed into the evidence file in lieu of
the originals and the copies \vere sent to the jury room as
such.
To take the position that a jury can distinguish between copies and originals in applying an instruction to
disrega~d pleadings is according to the limited experience
of the undersigned qu~te unrealistic, and possibly placing
an undue ~tress· upon the ability of a jury to apply instructions. Considering the great and wide trial experience of
the attorney general and his staff in the ~ight of the respondent's position as quoted above one cannot believe that
tbe' attorney general would be willing to apply the same
reasoning to the _same instruction in all instances where
pleadings are sub_mitted in evidence for the purpose of impeachment by the use of prior sworn statements.

CONCLUSION
. When the only defense bf one accused of Bastardy is
the impeachment of the prosecutrix by at~acking her: creditability, and this is done by the :use of prior, s~orn, Inc~n- ·
sistent statements, even though they be pleadings, an Instruction to disregard these- i'tems is material, is error,
is reversible error and was before the court in the appeal on
this matter and should have resulted in a reversal of the
conviction. of the appellant in the .District Court arid should
now result in a reversal.
·
Respectfully Submitted,
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Appellant.
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